News about Syria is difficult to parse, especially for those of us who are not expert in matters related to Kurds or Syria’s religious minorities, namely Syrian Christians (who come in different varieties), Druze, and Alawites (Alawites being an off-shoot of Shia-Islam that was the sect to which the Assad family belonged). There is, moreover, a fundamental divergence in the ways outside observers perceive Syria’s nascent regime and its leader, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa. It all boils down to the fundamental question of whether a sectarian jihadist can change his spots: Al-Sharaa was aligned with al-Qaeda and fought against American forces in Iraq, who at one point captured and detained him. Depending on whom you ask, al-Sharaa is either a gifted statesman or yet another bearded monster.

Before.

After

Al-Sharaa has gone to great lengths to distance himself from his jihadist roots and present himself as a pragmatic statesman eager to forge an inclusive non-Islamist and non-sectarian Syria. Recently he visited Paris, where French President Emmanual Macron feted him. One of the Middle East correspondents I respect the most, France 24’s Wassim Nasr, believes al-Sharaa is the real deal and should be given the benefit of the doubt. Others are much less certain, and they point to recent violence against Alawites and Druze as evidence of al-Sharaa’s ‘true nature.’ Once a jihadist, always a jihadist.

Indeed, massacres perpetrated this spring against Alawites by forces loyal to al-Sharaa suggest that the new Syria will look much like the old, the only difference being he that holds that butcher’s knife: It’s now Arab Sunnis’ turn to do the oppressing. The violence confirms the views of Syria pessimists, who consider it magical thinking to believe that Syria could ever be inclusive and non-sectarian, and who are certain the country, now free from Shia/Alawite domination, must inevitably become dominated by Sunni Islamists if it is to work at all.

Victims of the massacre of Alawites, 2025.

Perhaps the most important of the skeptics is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who appears to believe that a strong Syria under al-Sharaa’s leadership inevitably will be a threat to Israel, perhaps a greater threat even than Assad’s regime was, notwithstanding al-Sharaa’s marked hostility toward and expulsion from Syria of Iranians and their Hezbollah proxies. Israel therefore has grabbed bits of Syrian territory and conducted air strikes against various targets in Syria, largely for the purpose of denying al-Sharaa’s forces ready access to the remnants of the Syrian army’s weapons.

Netanyahu framed some of Israel’s interventions as bids to protect Druze, and the Israeli government appears to flirt with the idea of establishing a Druze autonomous zone at the expense of the Syrian state. Reportedly Israel’s most recent interventions on the behalf of Syrian Druze came at the request of Israeli Druze. The idea that Israel wishes to protect Syrian Druze cannot be discounted: Israelis in general are pro-Druze and see them as, more often than not, allies. I have seen no polling data, but I think it likely that most Israelis would back responding positively to calls for help from Druze. However, it seems clear that however much the Israeli government might take Syrian Druze’ welfare to heart, it is convinced keeping Syria weak is in its best interest. Perhaps to put it another way, Israel was ok with Assad because he was “the devil you know,” or quite simply the least bad option. Al-Sharaa is the devil they don’t know, and he undeniably has “devil” credentials. However, the last thing Israel wants—the worst-case scenario—is the emergence of a jihadist state bent on Israel’s destruction. They are betting that that is precisely what al-Sharaa would build.

None of us can know what is in al-Sharaa’s heart. The facts on the ground, however, tend to support the thesis that he is in earnest about building a non-Islamist and inclusive state. This, unfortunately, invariably will put him in conflict with Syria’s many groups that want more rather than less autonomy, if not outright independence. There also is the question of whether or not violence against minorities takes place because of or despite al-Sharaa’s direction. Violence in particular against Alawites no doubt reflects a great deal of pent-up hatred in a country wrecked by the cruelest of inter-communal violence, not to speak of a desire to turn the tables. Even if al-Sharaa has the best intentions, the task of reining in the country’s armed groups and forging something that approximates inclusivity and equity will involve bloodshed.

As for Israel, al-Sharaa pointedly has offered only muted criticism of Israeli actions and appears convinced that fighting Israel is the last thing Syria needs. This already represents a change: Whereas many Arab leaders like to use Israel as a scapegoat and a way to rally the ‘street’ behind them, al-Sharaa does not talk about Israel. Israel is not on his agenda. I strongly doubt he has anything but negative views of Israel, but he appears to think getting along with Israel to be more in Syria’s interest than not. Alternatively, he senses the need to pick his battles and prioritize. This would make him more of a pragmatist than an ideologue, which in and of itself is evidence that there is more to al-Sharaa than an Islamist.

Recent public visits by Syrian Druze religious leaders to Israel are particularly encouraging: It all took place with the Syrian government’s approval, something unthinkable under Syria’s previous governments. This, again, bespeaks pragmatism, if not good will. Why unnecessarily antagonizing either the Druze or Israel by preventing Syrian Druze delegations from crossing the border to visit religious sites and spend time with their coreligionists on the Israeli side?

Syrian Druze religious leaders arrive in Israel

No one should have any illusions about al-Sharaa and Syria, but there is a strong case to be made for giving him the benefit of the doubt and helping him to succeed. The best reason is the potential payoff: The emergence of a healthy, stable Syria at peace with itself and its neighbors, a Syria free of Iranian influence, would be a gigantic step forward for the entire region. Moreover, the pessimists’ view that the country is bound to end up a jihadist Sunni redoubt, while reasonable, most likely would lead to a self-fulfilling prophesy. A weak and divided Syria favors sectarianism and extremism. It favors Islamic State, which everyone agrees is worse even than al-Qaeda. A weak Syria also favors Turkey, which has designs of its own.

I’ll go further: I believe Netanyahu, by assuming the worst, is missing a strategic opportunity. Betting on al-Sharaa’s pragmatism offers less risk and a greater potential reward. They key may well be the Druze: Let them serve as a bridge rather than a source of conflict.

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My favorite books on war (Affiliate links)

Svetlana Alexievitch, “The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War II.”

Haruko Taya Cook, “Japan at War: An Oral History.”

Vasily Grossman, "Life and Fate."

Robert Heinlein, "Starship Troopers."

Ernst Jünger, “Storm of Steel.”

Ahmadou Kourouma, "Allah is not obliged."

Robert Leckie, “Helmet for my Pillow: From Paris Island to the Pacific.”

Väinö Linna, "Unknown Soldiers."

Jonathan Littell, "Les Bienveillantes, or The Kindly Ones." In French. In English.

Erich Maria Remarque, "All Quiet on the Western Front."

Pierre Schoendoerffer, "La 317e Section."

E.B. Sledge, “With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa.”