This morning (1 June) I glanced at my social media feeds for what I hilariously told myself would be a quick session, only to see that Ukraine had just done something with profound consequences.

I’m writing of course about the massive drone strike against several Russian air bases and possible even a submarine base. Details are sketchy; reports may be false. But at the time of writing, it seems to have been the case that Ukraine loaded “first person view” (FPV) drones onto truck trailers and parked them near the targeted bases. The truck drivers may not to have known what cargo they were carrying. The drones emerged from the trailers (automatically, at a set time? On command from someone, somewhere?) and then set about attacking parked long-range bombers and possibly submarines.

In the context of the Ukraine war, this already is Really Big News. It shows that Ukraine has invented for itself a long-range strike capability it did not have before. It means that Ukraine has now reduced significantly Russia’s ability to bomb it, or anyone. Moreover, if it’s true that the drone attack included Russian submarines, it represents a strike against something of extraordinary value for Russia, its nuclear deterrent capability. Never mind Russia’s obsolete bomber planes, nuclear submarines are for countries that have them the corner stone of their defense policy. They matter more than anything. What all this means for the course of Ukraine war is not yet clear, but no doubt the ramifications likely will be profound. An attack on one’s nuclear submarines cannot be brushed off.

The death of a Russian bomber.

But let’s think beyond the Ukraine war. Ukraine just did something that should scare the crap out of the militaries of the world: At low cost (compared to guided cruise or ballistic missiles), Ukraine hit targets of strategic value deep inside enemy territory using means few if any militaries are prepared to do anything about. The range of potential targets is limitless: refineries, factories, military bases, airports, ballistic missile silos, etc. All one has to do is get a truck or a shipping container loaded with drones somewhere close to a target. There may or may not need to be operators somewhere nearby with communications links.

This technology is akin to stealth technology: The threat is difficult to detect both because it emerges near the target and is too small and too low to be picked up by sensors designed to catch aircraft or missiles. Stinger or Patriot missile batteries would be all but useless. The fact that the drones are used in swarms means that even if some or intercepted (by what?) some have a good chance of getting through. Moreover, the drones can maneuver, either autonomously (AI) or thanks to someone with remote controls, enabling them to evade obstacles, or perhaps to find and pass through doors and windows or slip under netting.

Things like this anti-aircraft cannon need to make a comeback.

What militaries need to be asking themselves is what if anything is stopping someone from using the technology to strike vital infrastructure, like in Faslane, Scotland (home to the UK’s nuclear submarines, and more than a few visiting American boats as well), Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (home to much of the US Pacific Fleet), or Île Longue, France (home to French nuclear ballistic submarines). Getting containers loaded with drones to any of these locations may not be as easy as it was for Ukraine in Russia, but hardly impossible. And what if the trucks do reach their destinations, and one day swarms of FPV drones emerge? Are bases prepared to deal with them?

These days, why not?

Anti-drone netting. Expect to see this going up lots of places.

Militaries might have very good reasons to be confident that, for example, this could not happen at Faslane, which is in a relatively remote bit of Scotland, which itself is part of an island (Great Britain). Presumably one cannot just bring a container full of drones into a British port and drive it to a parking lot near the base. Or can one? Would that even be necessary? Maybe someone in Britain could acquire or even build the drones without detection and prepare truck trailers in a garage? How close does the truck’s final parking spot need to be? I rather doubt anyone has seriously thought the matter through. Why should they have? Why should the U.S. Navy have worried about FPV drone attacks in Groton, Connecticut? As of today, it must. Everyone must.

HMS Vigilant, Faslane. His Majesty’s real crown jewel.

USS Ohio in Groton, Connecticut.